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Abstract 
This dissertation aims to illustrate the impact of the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) on 
nominal interest rates, based on a deterministic simulation of Fernández-Villaverde 
and Rubio-Ramírez’ (2006) DSGE model of the U.S. economy. I calibrate the 
model for 2 different steady states, the first based on historical data (old steady 
state) and the second matching the most recent data, with lower inflation and lower 
real interest rates (new steady state). Within these calibrations I simulate the impact 
of a set of representative shocks. The ZLB appears to be of minor relevance in the 
old steady state while it is found to be a significant constraint in the new steady 
state. The associated impact on activity is relatively small but not negligible. My 
results are robust assuming alternative monetary policy rules. Hence, I conclude that 
conventional monetary policy tools are insufficient to anticipate the increased risk 
of hitting the ZLB in the new steady state. Further analysis of the exact transmission 
mechanism is warranted due to the simplified assumptions underlying this 
dissertation. 
Sumário 
Esta dissertação pretende ilustrar o impacto do limiar inferior das taxas de juros 
nominais (ZLB), com base numa simulação determinística do modelo DSGE para 
os EUA apresentado em Fernández-Villaverde e Rubio-Ramírez (2006). O modelo 
é calibrado para 2 estados estacionários, o primeiro com base em dados históricos 
(antigo estado estacionário) e o segundo com base em dados recentes, 
caracterizados por uma menor inflação e taxas de juros reais mais baixas (novo 
estado estacionário). Com base nesta calibrações, é simulado o impacto de um 
conjunto de choques representativos. O ZLB parece ser de menor relevância no 
antigo estado estacionário enquanto se verifica ser uma restrição significativa no 
novo estado estacionário. O impacto associado na atividade é relativamente 
pequeno, mas não negligenciável. Os resultados são robustos a regras de política 
monetária alternativas. Assim, concluo que os instrumentos convencionais de 
política monetária são insuficientes para evitar o maior risco de atingir o ZLB no 
novo estado estacionário. Mais investigação sobre o mecanismo de transmissão 
monetária próximo do ZLB é necessário, dadas as hipóteses simplificadoras 
subjacentes a esta dissertação. 
                                                          
Email address: 152214012@ucp.pt / daniel.baumler@student.uclouvain.be 
1 I am thankful to Professor Nuno Alves for all the advice and guidance during the last year, in particular during 
the process of writing this dissertation. I would also like to thank Professor Teresa Lloyd Braga and Mme 
Géraldine Carette for their help and suggestions throughout the Master’s. Finally, I am grateful to my parents 
and friends, for their patience and support I have always had. 
IMPACT OF THE ZLB CONSTRAINT ON MONETARY POLICY 2 
 
 
 
Contents 
 
1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 3 
2 Motivation ............................................................................................................................................ 4 
3 Model Set-Up ....................................................................................................................................... 7 
3.1 Deterministic Model Set-Up.......................................................................................................... 8 
3.2 Model Agents ................................................................................................................................ 8 
4 Model Calibration ............................................................................................................................... 10 
5 Simulating Deterministic Shocks ....................................................................................................... 11 
5.1 Model Mechanics ........................................................................................................................ 11 
5.1.1 Intertemporal preference shock. ........................................................................................... 12 
5.1.2 Labor supply shock............................................................................................................... 13 
5.1.3 Investment-specific technology shock.................................................................................. 14 
5.1.4 Shock to neutral technology. ................................................................................................ 16 
5.2 Simulating a Set of Representative Shocks ................................................................................. 17 
5.2.1 Defining a set of shocks. ...................................................................................................... 18 
5.2.2 Simulating shocks under pre-crisis conditions. .................................................................... 19 
5.2.3 Simulating shocks under post-crisis conditions.................................................................... 20 
6 Sensitivity Analysis ............................................................................................................................ 24 
7 Mitigating the Zero Lower Bound Risk ............................................................................................. 26 
8 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 28 
References ............................................................................................................................................. 30 
Annex .................................................................................................................................................... 35 
A. Post-War Experiences with the Zero Lower Bound ..................................................................... 35 
B. Model Set-Up and Sector Equations ............................................................................................. 35 
C. The Deterministic Steady State..................................................................................................... 38 
D. Euro Area and U.S. Recessions .................................................................................................... 40 
E. Shock Scenarios Under the “Old” and the “New Regime” ........................................................... 41 
F. Sensitivity Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 44 
 
 
IMPACT OF THE ZLB CONSTRAINT ON MONETARY POLICY 3 
 
 
1 Introduction 
The Federal Reserve Board decision to raise its target interest rate in December 2015 
followed an extended period of more than 7 years where interest rates were stuck at the zero 
lower bound (ZLB). Not only did this occur in the U.S. but also in several other advanced 
economies was the ZLB constraint on nominal interest rates binding for an extended period of 
time (see Annex A and Dordal-i-Carreras, Coibion, Gorodnichenko & Wieland, 2016). 
Obviously the sharp drop in interest rates across the world was first and foremost a reaction to 
the Great Recession of 2009. However, the extended duration of rates staying at historically 
low levels gives reason to believe that a more fundamental and persistent development 
occurred. Most prominently, Summers (2014b) argues that the equilibrium real rate of interest 
has decreased permanently over the last years. This is also related with the concept of secular 
stagnation which among other things implies that potential output growth has decreased 
permanently (Teulings & Baldwin, 2014). Other authors have focused on the evolution of the 
natural rate of interest (Williams, 2003) which has decreased likewise, alongside nominal 
rates of interest and inflation rates. 
This dissertation aims to analyze the impact of the ZLB constraint on nominal interest rates in 
this “new normal” – characterized by lower potential output growth, lower trend inflation, and 
a lower natural rate of interest2. In particular I will try to answer two questions: i) “Does the 
ZLB constraint change the dynamics of an economy following a set of shocks?”; and ii) “How 
do the features of the ‘new normal’ constrain the monetary policy response given the ZLB 
constraint?”. This will be done by simulating a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) model of the U.S. economy by Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2006) in a 
deterministic setting with perfect foresight and fully rational agents. This dissertation is 
structured as follows. After motivating the choice of this topic by presenting further data and 
reviewing the literature (section 2), the basic model set-up and its steady state will be 
presented (section 3). The model calibration follows in section 4. Afterwards the interaction 
of the model with the ZLB will be explored in detail, first, under a set of illustrative shocks, 
then, by a set of representative shocks based on historic data (section 5). A brief sensitivity 
analysis serves to support the results in section 6. The dissertation concludes with a summary 
                                                          
2 This dissertation follows William’s (2015) more long-run oriented definition of the natural rate of interest. This 
concept refers to the real policy rate which is consistent with the economy running at its full potential assuming 
transitory shocks have subsided which is expected to prevail only over a time-horizon of about 5 to 10 years. 
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of the most important results and a brief review of mitigating strategies with respect to the 
increased risks of hitting the ZLB. 
2 Motivation 
This dissertation is not only motivated by recent literature but especially by macroeconomic 
evidence. Looking at the data, the secular stagnation hypothesis seems, so far, to be 
confirmed. Holston, Laubach, and Williams (2016) estimated the inflation-adjusted natural 
rate of interest for the U.S., Canada, the U.K., and the euro area as displayed in figure 1. 
While it was in a range of around 2.5% to 3.5% in 1990, it decreased over the years, and 
reached a range of around -0.5% to 1.5% in 2015. 
 
Figure 1. Estimated inflation-adjusted natural rates of interest for Canada, the euro area, the U.S. and the U.K.. 
Figure adopted from Holston, Laubach & Williams (2016). 
Accordingly, a similar decline in trend growth can be observed. In the euro area it dropped 
from slightly below 3% during the 1980s to slightly above 1% in recent years (figure 2) 
whereas in the U.S. it declined from about 3.5% to 1.5% over the same time span (figure 3). 
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Figure 2. Euro area natural rate of interest and trend growth. Blue stripes represent periods of recession and r* 
stands for the natural rate of interest. Figure adopted from Holston, Laubach & Williams (2016). 
Figure 3. U.S. natural rate of interest and trend growth. Blue stripes represent periods of recession and r* stands 
for the natural rate of interest. Figure adopted from Holston, Laubach & Williams (2016). 
Furthermore, inflation rates have most recently decreased to historically low levels too. For 
instance, in the euro area, inflation has been below the target rate of 2% for more than 3 years, 
fluctuating around zero for almost 2 years (ECB, 2016). Also the U.S. has experienced a 
recent, but meanwhile 2-to-3-years-lasting, drop in inflation rates to levels close to zero 
(FRED, 2016). Also, supporting the argument of secular stagnation, it can be underlined that 
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projections of key parameters, such as potential output growth or the natural rate of interest, 
have been continuously and repeatedly revised downwards by the Federal Reserve Board 
since 2012 (Bernanke, 2016). While the natural rate of interest was seen at 4.25% and 
potential output growth at 2.3% to 2.5% in 2012 they were projected to be only 3.0% 
respectively 1.8% to 2.0% in 2016. Bernanke (2012) interprets these revisions as an 
acknowledgement by the FED of the new economic reality we live in. 
This brings me to the next observation one can take from reviewing recent literature on the 
natural rate of interest and output growth potential. Considering characteristics of the data of 
the last few years, researchers investigated intensively on what the “new economic reality” or 
the “new normal” actually is. Various research confirms the secular stagnation proponent’s 
hypothesis of these developments to be non-transient (Hamilton, Harris, Hatzius & West, 
2015; Lubik & Matthes, 2015; Williams, 2015). Laubach and Williams (2003), for instance, 
developed a model which is geared towards measuring highly persistent movements in the 
natural rate of interest. Their application of this model with most recent data does indeed 
detect a persistent decline of natural interest rates to levels close to zero which can be ascribed 
to a large part to the decrease in trend output growth (Laubach & Williams, 2016). Output 
growth for the U.S. is estimated to be at about 1.6% over the next 10 years according to 
Fernald’s (2016) forecasts. Meanwhile, he expects U.S. GDP per capita to grow by less than 
1% per year. 
The reasons for the adjustment of this “new normal” have been subjected to further research 
and go beyond Laubach and William’s (2016) conclusions. Part of the underlying reasons for 
these developments may be in fact structural, long-term developments. Another part, 
however, can be ascribed to the long-lasting effects caused by the Great Recession which is 
referred to as hysteresis (Summers, 2014a). To be more precise, hysteresis is the theory that 
explains how a severe economic shock can have adverse effects on potential output, as the 
structure of the economy is impacted sustainably by this shock (in my case, this would be the 
Great Recession). Another theory argues that the more fundamental reasons for the observed 
secular stagnation is the reversal of total factor productivity (TFP) growth to its historical 
norm (Gordon, 2014). According to Gordon (2014) this is complemented with a set of 
structural headwinds: demographics change towards an aging and stagnant population which 
has higher savings needs; the average (U.S.) education level is not likely to further increase 
significantly; the wealth distribution became more unequal slowing down the middle class 
income growth; and public debt might have reached levels at which current deficits become 
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unsustainable. All these developments cause a shift in the global supply of and demand for 
save assets, creating a global savings glut (Summers, 2014b; Williams 2016) which in turn 
impacts the real rate of interest. 
Obviously, these structural and persistent changes in economic conditions triggered a large set 
of research on the related consequences. The ZLB used to be considered to have a minor 
relevance for monetary policy, under the structural conditions prevailing in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s (Coenen, Orphanides & Wieland, 2003). Hitting the ZLB was believed to be a 
very rare, infrequent event which would only occur if nominal interest rates fell very 
significantly below their target level (Schmidt-Grohe & Uribe, 2010). The likelihood of ZLB 
events was often estimated to be in the area of approximately 1% to 5% (Dordal-i-Carreras et 
al., 2016). In contrast, under the current structural features characterizing advanced 
economies, the ZLB constraint on nominal interest rates is more likely to become binding. In 
this case, the room for stimulating policy rates gets smaller, and hence, unconventional 
monetary policy tools gain in relevance. Considering new cross-country time series, Chung, 
Laforte, Reifschneider and Williams (2012) for instance, suggest that the likelihood of hitting 
the ZLB vis-à-vis models calibrated based on pre-2010 figures has doubled. Recessions are 
expected to be longer lasting and more severe, recoveries to be slower, inflation rates to be 
more likely very low (Reifschneider & Williams, 2000; Williams 2016). ZLB events are 
generally more persistent and costlier than previously thought. Williams (2009) for example, 
estimates the cost of a 4-year ZLB event to amount up to $1.8 trillion. That is related to the 
fact that potential cost of such an event rise disproportionally with its duration. One long ZLB 
episode is thus costlier than two short ones with the same cumulative length (Coibion, 
Gorodnichenko & Wieland, 2012). 
In this thesis, I will illustrate the impact of some of these issues based on a standard DSGE 
model with an explicit ZLB constraint on nominal interest rates. The main features of the 
model are presented in the next section. 
3 Model Set-Up 
The model used for the analysis is the baseline sticky prices-sticky wages model presented in 
Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2006). There are four sectors in this economy: 
households, final good producers, intermediate good producers, and the monetary authority. 
Agents behave fully rationally and have perfect foresight. 
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3.1 Deterministic Model Set-Up 
This dissertation relies on simulating a deterministic version of the original model, which is 
the more appropriate approach considering that I do not want to linearize the model around a 
steady state and that the focus of the analysis will be comparing two different economic 
regimes, characterized by different steady states (Griffoli, 2013). As described in sections 1 
and 2, several key economic parameters have shifted to new levels and this shift will be 
analyzed in the simulations. Furthermore, the shocks which will be applied to the model are 
relatively large which makes a deterministic set-up more appropriate too. Besides, there is no 
perfect way (yet) of dealing with a non-linear, stochastic model analytically. Hence, working 
with a deterministic set-up serves the illustrative goals of this dissertation better, as it allows 
to work in a more transparent and simpler setting. In the following the most important 
characteristics of the model are summarized. For a full representation of this model please 
refer to Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez’ (2006) original paper or Annex B and C of 
this dissertation which contain a more comprehensive summary of this model, respectively the 
deterministic steady state equations. 
3.2 Model Agents 
There is a continuum of households which maximizes lifetime utility which is a function of 
consumption, real money balances and hours worked, subject to an intertemporal budget 
constraint. Households have habit persistence and supply labor according to a Frisch labor 
supply elasticity. An intertemporal preference shock as well as a labor supply shock enter the 
households’ utility function, which both follow first-order autoregressive processes (AR(1)). 
These processes have been modified in such a way that the shocks follow a fully deterministic 
path. 
As households supply labor to the intermediate goods producer they set their wages according 
to Calvo’s setting which implies that only a fraction of all households can modify their wage 
in a given period while the remaining households can only index their wage by past inflation. 
Besides spending it on consumption households can also save and invest their income. 
Investment and an investment-specific technology shock, which also follows an AR(1) 
process, determine capital evolution. 
Having access to technology and renting cost-optimal combinations of capital and labor, a 
continuum of intermediate goods is produced and sold to final good producers. The 
intermediate good producers’ production can be described as a function of capital, labor, and 
technology which evolves according to an AR(1) process that is subject to both the 
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deterministic shock to neutral technology and the investment-specific technology shock. 
Intermediate goods producers also set their prices according to Calvo’s scheme which implies 
that only a fraction of them can change their prices in a given period whereas the remaining 
firms can only index their prices by past inflation. 
In the perfectly competitive sector of final good production, profit maximizing firms, taking 
all prices as given, use a set of intermediate goods, which are characterized by a given 
elasticity of substitution, to produce one final good. 
The monetary authority steers the nominal interest rate according to the following Taylor rule, 
𝑅𝑡
𝑅
= (
𝑅𝑡−1
𝑅
)
𝛾𝑅
(
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)
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in which 𝑅𝑡 represents the nominal gross interest rate, 𝑅 the steady state nominal gross 
interest rate, Π𝑡 the rate of inflation, Π the target or steady state rate of inflation, 
𝑦𝑡
𝑑
𝑦𝑡−1
𝑑  real 
output growth, Λ𝑦𝑑 the steady state rate of output growth, and 𝑚𝑡 a (deterministic) monetary 
policy shock. Monetary policy is executed through open market operations which are financed 
by lump-sum transfers, 𝑇𝑡. 
There are different methods of implementing the ZLB, especially relevant in a stochastic 
context3. Since the subsequent simulations will be run in a deterministic environment, the 
ZLB constraint can be simply enforced as described below in equation (2). Straightforwardly, 
monetary policy follows a rule whereby interest rates will be zero if the reaction function 
would prescribe negative interest rates. 
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     (2). 
                                                          
3 One alternative is to do a log-linear approximation ignoring the ZLB, and only applying the constraint ex-post 
(Eggertsson & Woodford, 2003). However, this approach would violate the rational-expectations- respectively 
the perfect-foresight-assumption. Hence, a more appropriate alternative is to solve the model nonlinearly. 
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015), for instance, derive conditions involving expectations in order to smoothen 
the Taylor rule’s kink at the ZLB. Thus, the nominal interest rate can be calculated without any approximation. 
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4 Model Calibration 
The original calibration presented in Fernández-Villaverde (2010), which is based on 
historical data, will be the basis for the steady state associated with the “old regime”, 
prevailing until the early 2000s. The “new normal”, or as I will call it throughout this 
dissertation, the “new regime”, will refer to the current economic conditions, characterized by 
lower real rates, lower potential output growth and lower inflation rates. 
Fernández-Villaverde (2010) provides a full calibration of their model for the U.S. economy 
which is, for the most part, being adopted for the subsequent simulations within the “old 
regime”. The discount factor, 𝛽, is estimated to be 0.998 which is rather high compared to 
more standard choices of around 0.994 (Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2012). Habit persistence, 
h, is estimated to be 0.97 which can also be considered a comparatively high value. This is 
important though as it yields a model that responds to shocks slowly. The inverse of the 
Frisch elasticity of labor supply, 𝛾, is 1.17. That is relatively high, and hence, close to values 
suggested by microeconomic literature. On the other hand, a disadvantage of a low Frisch 
elasticity is that preference shocks need to be rather large to trigger an appropriate model 
response (Fernández-Villaverde, 2010). The Calvo parameters for price- respectively wage-
adjustment are specified to be 0.82 respectively 0.68. This ensures nominal rigidities in this 
model. The price-adjustment parameter implies that an average pricing cycle lasts 5 quarters 
whereas the wage-adjustment parameter ensures an average of 3 quarters per wage cycle. 
The Taylor rule is specified such that the Taylor principle is being respected with a coefficient 
on inflation of 1.29. The coefficient on output is 0.19 which is rather small and implies a 
weak response of monetary policy to output gaps. A relatively big coefficient on lagged 
interest rates of 0.77 signals that monetary policy follows a smooth path and does not react 
abruptly to shocks. The estimated target, respectively steady state rate of inflation, Π, is 4% 
annually, which is appropriate, considering historic data. When specifying the “new regime” 
the steady state rate of inflation shall be 2% to incorporate actual inflation targets and 
decreased inflation expectations. 
Steady state neutral technology growth, Λ𝐴, and steady state investment specific technology 
growth, Λ𝜇, are originally estimated to ensure an overall, annual steady state output growth, 
Λ𝑦𝑑, of 1.8% which is in line with the average historic real per capita growth rate of 1.8% for 
the U.S. between 1970 and 20164. Nevertheless, these parameters are maintained for the “old 
                                                          
4 Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database (2016) 
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regime”. In order to anticipate the hypothesized lower output growth potential, they are 
specified to trigger an overall output growth of 0.8% under the “new regime” which 
represents a one-percentage-point-drop – twice the reduction in FED projections between 
2012 and 2016 (Bernanke, 2016). Considering the historical U.S. output growth rate of 2.8% 
and Fernald’s (2016) projection of 1.6% annual U.S. output growth for the next 10 years from 
today, a one-percentage-point-drop seems to be appropriate to calibrate the “new regime”. 
This original calibration implies a steady state nominal rate of interest of 6.8% and a real rate 
of interest of 2.7%. Since the purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the relevance of the 
ZLB in the new “secular-stagnation-world”, the original real rate of interest and the steady 
state nominal rate of interest need to be lower in the “new regime” which is achieved by 
lowering steady state inflation and steady state technology growth. Table 1 provides an 
overview of the parameters that were modified to construct the “new regime” and the 
parameters which changed upon these modifications. 
 Old Regime New Regime 
Implicit real rate of interest (r*) 2.7% 1.7% 
Implicit steady state nominal interest rate (𝑹) 6.8% 3.7% 
Steady state rate of inflation (𝚷) 4.1% 2.0% 
Steady state neutral technology growth (𝚲𝑨) 1.1% 0.5% 
Steady state investment specific technology growth (𝚲𝝁) 1.4% 0.6% 
Implicit overall steady state output growth (𝜦𝒚𝒅) 1.8% 0.8% 
Table 1. Overview of parameters that are modified upon switching the simulation regime. All rates are p.a..  
5 Simulating Deterministic Shocks 
As mentioned before, instead of simulating stochastic, random shocks on each of the 
variables, specific shocks are being defined to test the model’s reaction in a fully deterministic 
set-up. I will analyze four different shocks embedded in the original model: the intertemporal 
preference shock, 𝜀𝑑,𝑡, the labor supply shock, 𝜀𝜑,𝑡, the investment-specific technology shock, 
𝜀𝜇,𝑡, and the shock to neutral technology, 𝜀𝐴,𝑡. 
5.1 Model Mechanics 
In order to better understand the model behavior under a binding and a non-binding ZLB, the 
four shocks are applied separately and with magnitudes big enough to trigger the nominal rate 
of interest to fall below, or respectively to, zero. Theses magnitudes are not intended to match 
representative shocks hitting the euro area or the U.S.. In the subsequent subsection, a set of 
shocks will be simulated which is supposed to be illustrative of recessions in the euro area and 
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the U.S. economy. In order to ensure that the ZLB becomes potentially binding, the model is 
calibrated with a very low steady state technology growth, inflation rate and a high discount 
factor, which shall be referred to as “test-calibration”.5  
5.1.1 Intertemporal preference shock. 
The intertemporal preference parameter enters the system in the household’s utility function. 
This shock is calibrated as a logarithmic AR(1) process with a low persistence parameter of 
0.12. Examining the shock to intertemporal preferences, 𝜀𝑑,𝑡, yields the first set of insights 
into the model mechanics. Upon a temporary, negative shock which causes 𝑑𝑡 to move 
downward, consumption, inflation, nominal interest rate, and output all decrease immediately, 
but temporarily. As consumption decreases also output decreases whereas investment 
increases since additional resources are saved instead of being consumed. As a consequence, 
inflation goes down as well as the policy rate. All movements appear only temporarily and 
variables revert to their steady state values after a while again. 
Figure 4. Impulse response functions of nominal interest rate (R), investment (x), inflation (Pie), and output (Y) 
on a negative preference shock, under a ZLB-constrained (blue line) and an unconstrained Taylor rule (red line). 
Deviations are relative to the steady state levels. 
                                                          
5 This “test-calibration” goes far beyond what has been dubbed the “new regime“ in preceding sections in order 
to construct an extreme scenario in which the ZLB becomes more relevant: Λ𝜇 = Λ𝐴 = 0.0001;  Π =
1.001;  𝛽 = 0.9999. 
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Assessing the situation with a binding ZLB, one can see in figure 4 that generally speaking 
the ZLB causes a higher drop in consumption, investment, and output. The policy rate cannot 
be as perfectly accommodative as it would be under an unconstrained Taylor rule. Hence, all 
of the aforementioned variables react more strongly than before. When closely examining the 
policy rate one can see that it first moves more quickly to the ZLB, stays there for a while, 
and then moves to positive territories slightly earlier than under the unconstrained Taylor rule. 
This can be ascribed to the fact that the system is fully deterministic and all agents have 
perfect foresight. Hence, the policy rate decreases more quickly in order to maximize the, now 
constrained, accommodative effect. In the long run all variables move back to their steady 
state in both cases. 
5.1.2 Labor supply shock. 
The labor supply shock enters the system in the household’s utility function as well. A 
negative labor supply shock causes households to supply more labor as the disutility of 
working is temporarily decreased. The shock is rather persistent due to a high persistence 
parameter of 0.93. As a consequence, the remaining macroeconomic variables move more 
slowly and persistently before returning to their steady state values in the long run. With 
higher labor input, output grows faster. Due to the characteristics of the intermediate goods 
sector’s production function, investment also increases. Labor becomes more affordable and 
thus, demand for capital increases to maintain efficient combinations of labor and capital 
upon producing intermediate goods. As output increases also consumption increases for a 
relatively long time as can be seen in figure 5. In the long run all variables return to their 
steady state levels. The increased supply of consumption goods and labor, puts pressure on 
wages and prices, causing inflation to decrease significantly. The policy rate decreases as a 
response to this effect, even though the increase in output prevents the Taylor rule to prescribe 
an even sharper decrease. 
IMPACT OF THE ZLB CONSTRAINT ON MONETARY POLICY 14 
 
 
Figure 5. Impulse response functions of nominal interest rate (R), labor (l), inflation (Pie), and consumption (c) 
on a negative labor supply shock, under a ZLB-constrained (blue line) and an unconstrained Taylor rule (red 
line). Deviations are relative to the steady state levels. 
Comparing the two (ZLB-)constrained and the unconstrained scenarios, despite a possibly 
differing chain of causalities, the same signs of relative differences as under the intertemporal 
preference shock can be observed. For the constrained scenario, the policy rate moves more 
quickly to the ZLB, inflation falls more sharply, investment increases less strongly, hence 
output increases less significantly, than in the unconstrained scenario. The difference in 
consumption across these two scenarios is, just as before, very small. 
5.1.3 Investment-specific technology shock. 
The investment-specific technology shock, 𝜀𝜇,𝑡, enters the system directly in the equation 
describing capital accumulation and indirectly in the intermediate goods sector’s production 
function. This shock is highly persistent. Applying a negative investment-specific technology 
shock increases the intermediary sector’s fixed production cost which, ceteris paribus, implies 
a reduction in intermediary goods output, and hence, final goods output. This has a direct, 
adverse impact on the households’ budget constraint implying a reduction in consumption and 
investment. Due to the decrease in utility, households prefer to decrease their labor supply as 
well, as the marginal utility of leisure has increased. Thus, all relevant endogenous variables - 
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output, consumption, investment, and labor - fall at first upon a negative shock to investment-
specific technology, as can be seen in figure 6. 
Afterwards, a prolonged increase of investment follows, while the technology growth rate 
returned to its original level already. During this post-shock period investment increases 
above the steady state level as the productivity boost makes capital investments more 
profitable. Consequently, households use relatively more resources to invest and relatively 
less to consume as can be seen in figure 6. After reaching its tipping point on a level higher 
than under normal conditions, investment returns together with productivity to the steady state 
in the long run. Consumption continuously increases back to its steady state without 
overshooting it. Due to the increase in capital, the demand for labor, and hence wages, 
increases, which contributes to an increase in production and inflation. Output as well as labor 
reproduce the investment’s reaction of overshooting the steady state for several periods before 
slowly returning to it. Those developments are addressed by monetary policy in lowering the 
nominal rate of interest. 
Figure 6. Impulse response functions of the nominal interest rate (R), consumption (c), investment (x), and labor 
(l) on a negative shock to investment specific technology, under a ZLB-constrained (blue line) and an 
unconstrained Taylor rule (red line). Deviations are relative to the steady state levels. 
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Comparing the (ZLB-)constrained and unconstrained scenarios, very similar relative 
differences as with the preceding two shocks can be observed. Investment, output growth, and 
inflation are below their “non-ZLB levels”, whereas, naturally, the policy rate is mainly above 
this level, except that it moves to the ZLB earlier and stays there a bit longer than in the 
unconstrained scenario. 
5.1.4 Shock to neutral technology. 
The shock to neutral technology, 𝜀𝐴,𝑡, enters the system at the intermediary sector’s 
production function in two ways. It directly impacts productivity as well as it enters the term 
determining fixed cost of production which ensures that economic profits remain close to zero 
in the steady state. This shock is also highly persistent. Upon a negative shock to neutral 
technology growth the system reacts in a uniformly, contractionary fashion, because neutral 
technology has a relatively higher weight in the cost part of the intermediary production 
function. Output, consumption, investment, and inflation initially decrease and revert slowly 
to their steady state levels, after neutral technology reverted to its steady state level of growth. 
Only investment shows some overshooting behavior when reverting to its steady state level, 
as can be seen in figure 7. One reason for this overshooting is that the capital stock requires 
some additional investment in order to reach its steady state level again in the long run. 
Nominal interest rates are set to accommodate a more stimulating environment when the 
system falls into recession. 
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Figure 7. Impulse response functions of nominal interest rate (R), consumption (c), investment (x), and output 
(Y) on a negative shock to neutral technology, under a ZLB-constrained (blue line) and an unconstrained Taylor 
rule (red line). Deviations are relative to the steady state levels. 
Comparing the two scenarios with a binding and a non-binding ZLB, a similar behavior as 
with other shocks can be observed. In the constrained scenario investment, output, and 
inflation lie below their unconstrained levels. Also consumption is slightly below the level it 
would have in the unconstrained scenario. However, the relative difference is only marginal, 
whereas investment shows once again the highest relative deviation, as can be seen in figure 
7. Nominal interest rates being constrained by the ZLB move there more quickly, remain 
above the level seen in the unconstrained scenario while reverting to the steady state for 
several periods. 
5.2 Simulating a Set of Representative Shocks 
After having understood the mechanics of this model in a deterministic setting and its 
interaction with the ZLB, this subsection’s goal is to define and to simulate a set of 
representative shocks in order to assess the actual relevance of the ZLB. This assessment will 
be held first in the original “old regime” followed by simulations in the “new regime” which 
has been defined in section 4. 
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5.2.1 Defining a set of shocks. 
To assess whether a set of shocks can serve as a realistic representation of reality, historic data 
shall be the benchmark. More specifically, the goal is to find a combination of shocks which 
approximates an average recession observable during the last 40-50 years in the euro area 
respectively in the U.S.. The CEPR6 Euro Area Business Cycle Dating Committee identifies 
five and the NBER7 Business Cycle Dating Committee identifies seven recessions in the time 
period of 1970 to 2015. 
By de-trending quarterly real GDP8 using an HP (1600) filter these recessions can be 
measured. The size of a recession is calculated by taking the difference between a peak and a 
trough of the cyclical component of GDP. In order to estimate the size of a standard recession, 
the great recession during 2008 and 2009 is excluded from my calculations as it represents an 
extraordinary event.9 Hence, there remain four recessions for the euro area of which the 
largest one had its trough in the first quarter of 1975 and a magnitude of 4.0%. The smallest 
one reached its trough in the first quarter of 2013 and amounted to 1.7% of real GDP. The 
average size of a recession for the euro area was 3.2%. For the U.S. there remain six 
recessions of which the largest one, occurring in the first quarter of 1975 as well, was 6.6%, 
whereas the smallest one was 1.6%, reaching its trough in November 2001. The average size 
of a recession for the U.S. being 3.8%, was slightly larger than in the euro area. 
Fernández-Villaverde (2010) provides a set of standard-sized shocks. These given magnitudes 
shall be the starting point to make an initial assessment whether they fit the above sketch of a 
representative recession in the euro area or the U.S.. Applying all of the four negative 
standard shocks simultaneously, the maximum drawdown from steady state output trend is 
about 2.9% which is slightly below the range of 3.2% to 3.8%. Thus, this combination of 
shocks can be considered as an example for a small recession (scenario A). A combination of 
1.5-fold standard shocks yields an output drop of 4.3% and will represent a large recession 
(scenario B). A combination of twofold standard shocks yields an output drop of 5.7% and 
represents a severe recession (scenario C), while a combination of 2.5-fold standard shocks 
yielding an output loss of 7.0% shall represent an extreme case scenario (scenario D) such as 
the Great Recession of 2008 and 2009 for instance. Besides combinations of several shocks, 
                                                          
6 Centre for Economic Policy Research 
7 National Bureau of Economic Research 
8 Euro area data is taken from the Area Wide Model (AWM) dataset by Gabriel Fagan, Jérôme Henry and 
Ricardo Mestre. U.S. data is taken from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database. 
9 According to the applied calculations methods the Great Recession came along with an output loss of 5.2% in 
the U.S., respectively 6.3% in the euro area. 
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also multiples of individual shocks will be simulated and analyzed separately in order to 
evaluate the differing relevance of the ZLB. 
5.2.2 Simulating shocks under pre-crisis conditions. 
Once the set of shocks has been defined, the model reactions towards them shall be analyzed 
more thoroughly. The first set of simulations is run under the “old regime” which is 
representative to the economic reality before the Great Recession of 2008-2009. The drops in 
output growth have already been mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Even though the 
simple standard shocks simulated do not even cause large recessions, it typically takes a high 
number of periods – one period equals one quarter – until output returns to its steady state. 
Under the set of simple standard shocks causing a small recession of 2.9% of steady state 
output (scenario A), it takes around 44 periods for output to go back to steady state (deviation 
<0.10%). Even upon applying shocks individually the time for output to revert to the steady 
state is about 44 periods for a standard shock to neutral technology, 52 periods for a standard 
labor supply shock or 22 periods for a standard intertemporal preference shock. 
Even though the various impulse response functions on individual shocks have already been 
described and analyzed in the preceding sections, they have not been discussed upon 
combinations of several shocks nor have the individual shocks been compared with respect to 
their different sizes of impact. First of all, comparing the individual standard shocks, yields 
that the shock to neutral technology has the biggest, while the shock to investment specific 
technology, as well as the shock to labor supply have hardly any negative effect on output.10 
The same observation holds when comparing the individual standard shocks with respect to 
their “ZLB relevance”: The shock to investment specific technology and the shock to labor 
supply have the least impact, while the shock to neutral technology has the largest negative 
impact on nominal interest rates. Once the shocks’ standard magnitudes are multiplied, further 
observations can be made. As can be seen in figure 8, the labor supply shock has hardly any 
effect on output and is more effective in driving the system closer to the ZLB, whilst the 
shocks to neutral technology and intertemporal preferences have a relatively higher effect on 
output, compared to nominal interest rates. 
Even though some of the individual standard shocks trigger considerable decreases in nominal 
interest rates, the ZLB has no significant relevance for them in the “old regime”. Only an 11-
fold standard shock to labor supply manages to push the policy rate to the ZLB. However, the 
                                                          
10 Further details on this can be looked up in table E1 of Annex E. 
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ZLB constraint has hardly any effect on the maximum output loss under this type of shock. 
Hence, this scenario can easily be neglected for any purposes. Furthermore, under a 
combination of all four standard shocks, the policy rate does not go below 4.97%, 
representing a drop of only 190 basis points from the steady state (which is 6.78% in this 
regime). Upon simulating a 2.5-fold combination of standard shocks, which represents the 
extreme case scenario, there still remains a buffer of 235 basis points towards the ZLB. Only 
upon applying a 3.5-fold combination of standard shocks – which implies an unrealistically 
high output drop of 9.4% – the system moves relatively close to the ZLB.11 Hence, the ZLB is 
basically non-binding under the “old regime” which is confirmed by actual data of the past 
40-50 years. Usually, the buffer towards the ZLB is sufficiently large. 
 
Figure 8. Overview of maximum output losses and minimum nominal interest rates under different shock 
scenarios in the “old regime”. Only representative scenarios of combinations of shocks are displayed: A = 1-fold, 
B = 1.5-fold, C = 2-fold, and D = 2.5-fold combination of standard shocks. Further scenario details as well as 
other scenarios can be looked up in table E1 of Annex E. 
5.2.3 Simulating shocks under post-crisis conditions. 
Considering the “new regime”, yields different conclusions. The ZLB becomes naturally a 
more relevant constraint as the new steady state is characterized by a lower nominal interest 
rate. The distance to the ZLB is 366 basis points in this calibration while it was 678 basis 
points before, as displayed in figure 9. Furthermore, due to the characteristic set-up of the 
monetary policy rule, which remains unchanged upon the “regime” change, the same shock 
scenarios trigger larger drops in nominal interest rates than under the “old regime”. This 
                                                          
11 Further details on this and other type of shocks can be looked up in table E1 of Annex E. 
D
C
B
A
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8%
m
in
. R
 (
in
 b
ps
)
max. output loss (in % of steady state)
IMPACT OF THE ZLB CONSTRAINT ON MONETARY POLICY 21 
 
 
difference is, for most scenarios, roughly 10% to 20% of the “old regime’s” interest rate 
decrease12. 
Figure 9. Impulse response functions of the nominal interest rate (R) during shock scenario A in the “old” (blue 
line) and “new regime” (red line). Rates are p.a.. 
Hence, driving the system close to the ZLB (or below) does not require as large shocks as 
before anymore. A large recession (scenario B) yields a nominal interest rate of 44 basis 
points above zero. The scenarios C, D, E, and F, representing combinations of twofold 
standard shocks and higher orders, cause the system to hit the ZLB. Another effect observable 
in the “new regime” calibration is the fact that all shocks, except the shock to labor supply, 
trigger slightly smaller output deviation from the steady state compared to simulations in the 
“old regime”. For example, a combination of simple standard shocks (scenario A) induces a 
fall in output of only 2.82%, whereas it fell by 2.94% in the “old regime” calibration for the 
same scenario of shocks. This can be explained by the specific construction of the monetary 
policy rule in this model which induces interest rate reactions as a function of relative (and 
not absolute) deviations from steady state output and steady state inflation. Hence, as the 
same type of shock induces a relatively larger deviation from steady state in the new regime, 
monetary policy replies more strongly as can be seen in figure 9. Nominal interest rates are 
decreased more strongly in the “new regime” (216 bps instead of 181 bps). Consequently, 
absolute output loss is kept slightly smaller. 
Looking at the actual ZLB relevance, it can be concluded that hitting the ZLB would require 
at least a combination of shocks consistent with a severe recession and is thus still a relatively 
                                                          
12 This is mostly true for scenarios with significant interest rate drops (>100 bps). 
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unlikely event. Similar sized recessions13 have occurred three times in the U.S. and zero times 
in the euro area economy during the last 45 years. 
 
Figure 10. Overview of maximum output losses and minimum nominal interest rates under different shock 
scenarios in the “new regime”. Only representative scenarios of combinations of shocks are displayed: A = 1-
fold, B = 1.5-fold, C = 2-fold, and D = 2.5-fold combination of standard shocks. Further scenario details as well 
as other scenarios can be looked up in table E1 of Annex E. 
In order to gain a better understanding of the effects of the ZLB in this “new regime” 
environment, scenarios D and C are examined more carefully. As mentioned before, enforcing 
the ZLB constraint causes a higher output loss and hence, a higher loss in consumption. 
Losses in consumption are, however, relatively small compared to differences in output. 
Another significant difference is the lower inflation rate. If the policy rate cannot be lowered 
below the ZLB, inflation rates decrease relatively stronger as can be seen in figure 11. Since 
the constrained policy rate causes a less accommodative environment, the temporary counter 
reaction of output growth above the steady state is not as strong as in the unconstrained case. 
                                                          
13 Maximum output loss of at least 5% of GDP. 
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Figure 11. Impulse response functions of nominal interest rates (R), consumption (c), inflation (Pi), and output 
(Y) in shock scenario D in the “new” (red lines) and the “old regime” (blue lines). Dashed lines represent 
scenarios with an unconstrained monetary policy rule. Inflation and interest rates are p.a., output and 
consumption are relative to their steady state. 
Comparing the “new” and the “old regime” impulse response functions under a constrained 
monetary policy is also an interesting analysis. To this end, shock scenario D which 
represents an extreme case recession, depicted in figure 11, is analyzed further. The first and 
most obvious observation is that the nominal interest rate is decreasing significantly less in 
the “new regime”. Secondly, because monetary policy is not as accommodative as it should 
be, the inflation rate decreases much stronger. While it decreased by about 5.7 percentage 
points in the “old regime”, it dropped by more than 10 percentage points in the “new regime”. 
When looking at output and consumption, the differences are comparatively smaller. Output 
decreases at its lowest point 34 basis points more, and consumption only 6 basis points more 
in the “new regime” with a constrained monetary policy rule. 
This allows two conclusions. First, the ZLB is more likely to become a binding constraint in 
the “new regime” calibration representing the current economic regime. It required a 
combination of shocks sized at least twice the size of standard shocks which includes a severe 
recession and an extreme case scenario such as the Great Recession. Hence, hitting the ZLB 
can still be considered an unlikely event. 
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Secondly, in this model, hitting the ZLB, yields under this specific calibration, relatively 
small losses in consumption and output. Hence, the harm in terms of GDP caused by the ZLB 
constraint is almost negligible under combinations of shocks up to a certain size. It is fair to 
say that the potential output and consumption losses caused by the ZLB constraint increase 
exponentially with the size of the shock. 
6 Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis is performed in order to test the robustness of the above results. The 
robustness of results is tested under monetary policy rules calibrated in different ways than 
the original model calibration by Fernández-Villaverde (2010) suggests. The base assumption 
is that the key results remain conceptually the same for most calibrations of the Taylor rule. 
The Taylor rule is specified by three parameters (𝛾𝑅, 𝛾𝑦, 𝛾𝜋) in this model, which are modified 
in order to construct different reaction functions. I re-ran my simulations with two alternative 
monetary policy rule specifications, by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt (2015) and by 
Bokan, Gerali, Gomes, Jacquinot and Pisani (2016), and with the original standard 
specification proposed by Taylor (1993) which inhibits no smoothing of interest rates. Table 2 
summarizes the tested calibration alternatives. 
 Coefficient on lagged 
interest rates (𝜸𝑹) 
Coefficient on 
inflation (𝜸𝝅) 
Coefficient on the 
output gap (𝜸𝒚) 
Bokan et al. (2016) 0.870 1.700 0.100 
Christiano et al. (2015) 0.751 1.666 0.247 
Fernández-Villaverde (2010) 0.770 1.290 0.190 
Taylor (1993) 0.000 1.500 0.500 
Table 2. Overview of different monetary policy rule specifications applied in the sensitivity analysis. 
The results of the different sensitivity simulations strongly depend on the monetary policy 
rule specification. Generally, the original Taylor rule prescribes the strongest drop in interest 
rates. Hence, the ZLB becomes binding more easily. Bokan et al.’s (2016) resp. Christiano et 
al.’s (2015) calibration trigger monetary policy reactions slightly weaker resp. stronger than 
Fernández-Villaverde’s (2010) original calibration as can be seen in figure 12. 
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Figure 12. Overview of maximum output losses and minimum nominal interest rates under different shock 
scenarios and monetary policy rules, in the “old regime”. Only representative scenarios of combinations of 
shocks are displayed: A = 1-fold, B = 1.5-fold, C = 2-fold, and D = 2.5-fold combination of standard shocks. 
Further scenario details as well as other scenarios can be looked up in table F1-3 of Annex F. 
Starting with observations made on simulations in the “old regime” environment, it can be 
concluded that, except for the original Taylor rule (1993), results are broadly the same. The 
ZLB is no constraint under the representative shocks, which is due to the fact that the two 
alternative specifications do not significantly deviate from the model’s originally calibrated 
monetary policy rule. The original Taylor rule prescribes interest rates close to zero already 
upon a 1.5-fold shock. Twofold shocks and beyond cause the ZLB to become a binding 
constraint associated with output losses of up to 0.12% (scenario C) resp. 0.50% (scenario D) 
of steady state GDP. 
In the “new regime” environment the ZLB moves closer to the steady state. Hence, the 
interest rate reactions prescribed by the original Taylor rule are now theoretically all below 
zero as can be seen in figure 13. While monetary policy would be effectively constrained by 
the ZLB in scenario C and D under the calibration proposed by Bokan et al. (2016), the ZLB 
would represent no effective constraint in all scenarios under the specification proposed by 
Christiano et al. (2015). 
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Figure 13. Overview of maximum output losses and minimum nominal interest rates under different shock 
scenarios and monetary policy rules in the “old regime”. Only representative scenarios of combinations of 
shocks are displayed: A = 1-fold, B = 1.5-fold, C = 2-fold, and D = 2.5-fold combination of standard shocks. 
Further scenario details as well as other scenarios can be looked up in table F4-6 of Annex F. 
Thus, considering that the original Taylor rule with no persistence in interest rates is not a 
good benchmark of monetary policy today, it can be concluded that the results in the previous 
sections are qualitatively robust. Nevertheless, the choice of monetary policy rule has some 
impact on how early the ZLB becomes a binding constraint. There are specifications under 
which the ZLB has no binding effect, even though the buffer towards it becomes almost zero 
under an extreme recession. Considering that the ZLB has become a binding constraint during 
the Great Recession in most advanced economies, these policy rules may not be a good 
benchmark to analyze monetary policy as currently conducted by central banks. 
7 Mitigating the Zero Lower Bound Risk 
With respect to the preceding sections discussing how the ZLB becomes a more binding 
constraint under low inflation regimes, increasing the inflation target has obviously the 
advantage of increasing the potential buffer towards the ZLB. The steady state policy rate 
would move up alongside an inflation target increase. Hence, the buffer between the steady 
state nominal interest rate and the ZLB would increase by the same amount. This measure 
would mechanically mitigate the effect of lower steady state growth with respect to the buffer 
to the ZLB. 
Not only would this increase the scope for monetary policy to provide stimulus during shocks, 
but also would it provide additional flexibility for the adjustment of real prices and wages. 
Downward nominal wage rigidities would be better mitigated under a higher steady state 
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inflation (Daly & Hobijn, 2014). This is beneficial as it allowed the labor market to adjust 
under a negative shock more quickly by lowered wages and less by increased unemployment. 
Nevertheless, no major central bank has increased or even openly discussed increasing the 
inflation target. That is in part related to political resistance, which is particularly high in 
countries like Germany, for instance, which has a history of costly hyperinflation. 
Furthermore, increasing the inflation target has substantial economic disadvantages. A higher 
steady state inflation is typically associated with distortions in cash holdings, overinvestment 
in the financial sector, greater uncertainty about relative prices and the aggregate price level, 
distortions in the tax system, and redistribution of wealth (Mishkin, 2011). Another 
significant impediment is related to credibility. Not only is it questionable if central banks 
could fully convince market participants of a higher inflation target but also is there the threat 
of un-anchoring inflation expectations. Bernanke (2010) argues that increasing the inflation 
target once, would significantly increase uncertainty about inflation expectations and would 
have negative effects on the overall credibility of a central bank. One common criticism is the 
potentially increased overall volatility. However, Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2013) 
come to the conclusion that, at least in a DSGE environment, there is no trade-off between 
inflation and output stabilization. 
Still, increasing the inflation target appears not to be necessary at this point, as central banks 
apply a set of unconventional monetary policy tools allowing them to decrease interest rates 
beyond levels possible with conventional measures. Most prominently, all major central banks 
performed large-scale asset purchases as well as reinforced their forward guidance. Both 
measures have proven to be successful at reducing the harm caused by the ZLB constraint 
(Chung et al., 2012; Coenen & Warne, 2013). Chung et al. (2012) estimate, for instance, the 
U.S. quantitative easing programs to having had a stimulating effect to the job market from 
2009 to 2012, equivalent to a counterfactual policy rate decrease of about 300 basis points, 
which would have not been possible due to the ZLB constraint. 
Another unconventional measure which gained some more attention recently is the so-called 
“helicopter money” which refers to a way of directly financing the economy through the 
central bank circumventing the banking system as an intermediary. Buiter (2014), among 
others, argues that, given a set of conditions, the threats of deflation or low inflation can 
effectively be avoided by this way of direct private sector financing. “Helicopter money” has 
its strong opponents as well, for legitimate reasons. The most obvious reason is that central 
banks would risk their independence by such powerful interventions which usually fall into 
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the domain of fiscal policy. Issing (2015) claims that once a central bank breaks this taboo of 
directly financing the private sector, it is likely to experience strong political pressure to 
provide this measure more regularly or permanently. It remains questionable if the central 
bank would be able to withstand this kind of political pressure. Hence, existing 
unconventional measures are likely to remain the tool of choice to complement conventional 
monetary policy and to mitigate the ZLB. 
8 Conclusion 
To conclude, it has been shown that the new economic environment of lower real interest 
rates, lower steady state inflation, and lower potential growth causes the ZLB constraint to 
become a more likely event which does affect the dynamics of an economy following a set of 
shocks. Nevertheless, it has been illustrated that it still remains unlikely and that the 
associated costs seem to be comparatively small in my simplified setting. This second finding 
does to some extent qualify recent results of economic literature, such as for instance by 
Dordal-i-Carreras et al. (2016) who concluded that once the ZLB becomes binding it is 
typically very costly due to the long duration. It may be the case however, that the simplified 
model that has been used for my simulations systematically underestimates the duration of 
ZLB periods. Thus, it may not be suitable to make qualified statements about the welfare 
costs associated with the ZLB constraint. 
Furthermore, it has been concluded that increasing the buffer to the ZLB during steady state – 
for example by increasing the inflation target – should be no urgent goal of policy makers. 
This conclusion is reinforced if it is being taken into account that there are various ways of 
mitigating the ZLB effects or of increasing this buffer, including large-scale asset purchase 
programs and forward guidance.  
Looking at current states of the economies in the euro area and the U.S., it remains 
questionable though, if the new steady state has adjusted already. With nominal interest rates 
close to the ZLB, the above simulations and illustrations have little relevance, as any kind of 
shock makes the ZLB, with almost certainty, a binding constraint. Thus, the longer the 
economies are in this state, the more relevant becomes the question on how to effectively 
address the ZLB constraint. The simulations performed assume a new steady state with 
nominal interest rates at about 370 basis points above zero. If it turns out that the current 
environment of 2016 is much closer to the new steady state than previously anticipated the 
above findings lose much of their validity. The revised conclusion would be that the ZLB is a 
highly immediate and certain constraint during most of the time. Additional measures such as 
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increasing the inflation target or more unconventional measures including asset purchases and 
possibly “helicopter money” would need to be on the agenda of central banks in the near 
future. 
Hence, one subject which obviously needs to be researched more thoroughly is the 
investigation of the “new normal” i.e. the new steady state of the euro area and the U.S. 
economies. Only if this question has been clarified, a more pragmatic discussion on the 
necessary policy tools can be held. The transmission of monetary policy under very low 
interest rates, in particular with regards to the interaction with the financial sector, also calls 
for further research. 
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Annex 
A. Post-War Experiences with the Zero Lower Bound 
 Beginning of 
ZLB Period 
End of ZLB 
Period 
Duration 
(quarters) 
Duration 
(years) 
Unconditional 
Frequency of 
ZLB for 
Country 
Australia N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.00 
Canada 2009Q2 2010Q2 5 1.25 0.02 
Germany/ECB 2009Q3 2010Q4 6 1.5 0.09 
Germany/ECB 2012Q1 2016Q3* 19 4.75 0.09 
Japan 1998Q4 2006Q3 32 8 0.24 
Japan 2008Q4 2016Q3* 32 8 0.24 
New Zealand N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.00 
Norway N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.00 
Sweden 2009Q3 2010Q3 5 1.25 0.05 
Sweden 2014Q3 2016Q3* 9 2.25 0.05 
Switzerland 1972Q1 1972Q1 1 0.25 0.17 
Switzerland 1972Q3 1972Q3 1 0.25 0.17 
Switzerland 1978Q1 1979Q1 5 1.25 0.17 
Switzerland 2003Q1 2004Q3 7 1.75 0.17 
Switzerland 2008Q4 2016Q3* 32 8 0.17 
United States 2008Q4 2015Q4 29 7.25 0.11 
United 
Kingdom 
2009Q1 2016Q3* 31 7.75 0.12 
AVERAGE 15.3 3.8 0.08 
Table A1. This table summarizes ZLB periods for advanced economies since World War II. Germany is 
representative for the euro area. Countries which are currently at the ZLB, are listed with 2016Q3 as end of ZLB 
period. Unconditional frequencies are based on the time frame 1950Q1 until 2016Q3. Adapted from Dordal-i-
Carreras et al., 2016. Updated with recent data from the BOE, the BOJ, the ECB, the Federal Reserve System, 
the SNB, and the Swedish Riksbank. Complemented by own calculations. 
B. Model Set-Up and Sector Equations 
A continuum of households indexed by j maximizes lifetime utility which depends positively 
on consumption, 𝑐𝑗𝑡, on real money balances, (
𝑚𝑗𝑡
𝑝𝑡
), and negatively on hours worked, 𝑙𝑗𝑡. 
𝔼0∑𝛽
𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
𝑑𝑡 {log(𝑐𝑗𝑡 − ℎ𝑐𝑗𝑡−1) + 𝑣 log (
𝑚𝑗𝑡
𝑝𝑡
) − 𝜑𝑡𝜓
𝑙𝑗𝑡
1+𝛾
1 + 𝛾
}     (1), 
in which 𝛽𝑡 represents the discount factor, h habit persistence, 𝛾 the inverse of Frisch labor 
supply elasticity, and 𝑑𝑡 an intertemporal preference shock. 𝑑𝑡 and the labor supply shock, 𝜑𝑡, 
are specified as autoregressive processes of order one (AR(1)). Instead of letting these 
processes evolve by a stochastic factor of white noise, as in Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-
Ramírez (2006), specific shock terms, 𝜀𝑑,𝑡 and 𝜀𝜑,𝑡, with given magnitudes are defined for the 
purpose of the following deterministic simulations: 
log 𝑑𝑡 = 𝜌𝑑 log 𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑑,𝑡     (2) 
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and 
log𝜑𝑡 = 𝜌𝜑 log𝜑𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜑,𝑡     (3). 
The households’ optimization problem is subject to the following budget constraint: 
𝑐𝑗𝑡 + 𝑥𝑗𝑡 +
𝑚𝑗𝑡
𝑝𝑡
+
𝑏𝑗𝑡+1
𝑝𝑡
+∫𝑞𝑗𝑡+1,𝑡𝑎𝑗𝑡+1𝑑𝜔𝑗,𝑡+1,𝑡
= 𝜔𝑗𝑡𝑙𝑗𝑡 + (𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑗𝑡 − 𝜇𝑡
−1𝑎[𝑢𝑗𝑡])𝑘𝑗𝑡−1 +
𝑚𝑗𝑡−1
𝑝𝑡
+ 𝑅𝑡−1
𝑏𝑗𝑡
𝑝𝑡
+ 𝑎𝑗𝑡 + 𝑇𝑡 + Ϝ𝑡     (4) 
where 𝑎𝑗𝑡+1 represents an amount of tradable Arrow-Debreu securities which pay one unit of 
consumption in event 𝜔𝑗,𝑡+1,𝑡 at a price 𝑞𝑗𝑡+1,𝑡, 𝑏𝑗𝑡+1 the amount of government bonds held 
by household j that pay a nominal gross interest rate of 𝑅𝑡, 𝜔𝑗𝑡 the real wage, 𝑟𝑡 the real 
interest rate on capital, 𝑢𝑗𝑡 > 0 the utilization rate of capital, 𝜇𝑡
−1𝑎[𝑢𝑗𝑡] the physical cost of 
capital usage, 𝜇𝑡 an investment-specific technology shock, 𝑇𝑡 a lump-sum transfer, Ϝ𝑡 profits 
of the firms, and 𝑥𝑗𝑡 investment which determines capital evolution according to the following 
process: 
𝑘𝑗𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡 (1 − 𝑆 [
𝑥𝑗𝑡
𝑥𝑗𝑡−1
]) 𝑥𝑗𝑡      (5) 
where 𝛿 represents the depreciation rate and 𝑆[∙] an adjustment cost function. The investment-
specific technology shock, 𝜇𝑡, evolves according to the following AR(1) process: 
𝜇𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡−1𝑒
(Λ𝜇+𝜀𝜇,𝑡)     (6) 
where Λ𝜇 represents the growth rate of investment and 𝜀𝜇,𝑡 the actual deterministic 
investment-specific technology shock. As households supply labor to the intermediate goods 
producer they set their wages according to Calvo’s setting which implies that only a part of all 
households can modify their wage in a given period while the remaining households can only 
index their wage by past inflation. 
In the perfectly competitive sector of final good production, firms are subject to the following 
production function: 
𝑦𝑡
𝑑 = (∫ 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝜀−1
𝜀
1
0
𝑑𝑖)
𝜀
𝜀−1
     (7). 
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𝜀 represents the elasticity of substitution between different intermediate goods. There is one 
final good which is produced using a set of intermediate goods. Final good producers 
maximize their profits, taking final as well as intermediate goods prices as given. 
Having access to technology and renting cost-optimal combinations of capital and labor, a 
continuum of intermediate goods is produced and sold to final good producers. The 
intermediate goods production function is described as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝑘𝑖𝑡−1
𝛼 (𝑙𝑖𝑡
𝑑 )
1−𝛼
− 𝜙𝑧𝑡     (8). 
The neutral technology parameter 𝐴𝑡 evolves according to the following AR(1) process: 
𝐴𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡−1e
(Λ𝐴+𝜀𝐴,𝑡)     (9). 
𝜀𝐴,𝑡 represents the deterministic shock to neutral technology growth, 𝜙 is the fixed cost of 
production and 𝑧𝑡 is a function of 𝐴𝑡 and 𝜇𝑡 which evolves according to the following AR(1) 
process: 
𝑧𝑡 = 𝑧𝑡−1e
(Λ𝑧+𝜀𝑧,𝑡)     (10). 
𝜀𝑧,𝑡 stands for the shock to 𝑧𝑡 which is a function of the other two technology shocks 𝑧𝐴,𝑡 and 
𝑧𝜇,𝑡. Intermediate goods producers set their prices according to Calvo’s scheme which implies 
that only a fraction of them can change their prices in a given period whereas the remaining 
firms can only index their prices by past inflation. 
The monetary authority steers the nominal interest rate according to the following Taylor rule: 
𝑅𝑡
𝑅
= (
𝑅𝑡−1
𝑅
)
𝛾𝑅
(
 
 
(
Π𝑡
Π
)
𝛾Π
(
 
 
𝑦𝑡
𝑑
𝑦𝑡−1
𝑑
Λ𝑦𝑑
)
 
 
𝛾𝑦
)
 
 
1−𝛾𝑅
𝑒𝜀𝑚,𝑡     (11𝑎). 
𝑅 represents the steady state nominal gross interest rate, Π the target or steady state rate of 
inflation, Λ𝑦𝑑 the steady state rate of output growth, and 𝜀𝑚,𝑡 a (deterministic) monetary 
policy shock14. Monetary policy is executed through open market operations which are 
financed by lump-sum transfers 𝑇𝑡 described by the following equation: 
                                                          
14 This shock to monetary policy is not subject to any of the simulations of this dissertation. 
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𝑇𝑡 =
∫ 𝑚𝑗𝑡𝑑𝑗
1
0
𝑝𝑡
−
∫ 𝑚𝑗𝑡−1𝑑𝑗
1
0
𝑝𝑡
+
∫ 𝑏𝑗𝑡+1𝑑𝑗
1
0
𝑝𝑡
− 𝑅𝑡−1
∫ 𝑏𝑗𝑡𝑑𝑗
1
0
𝑝𝑡
     (12). 
There are different methods of implementing the ZLB. One alternative is to do a log-linear 
approximation ignoring the ZLB and only applying the constraint ex-post. However, this 
approach would violate the rational-expectations- respectively the perfect-foresight-
assumption. Hence, a more appropriate alternative is to solve the model nonlinearly. 
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015), for instance, derive conditions involving expectations in 
order to smoothen the Taylor rule’s kink at the ZLB. Thus, the nominal interest rate can be 
calculated without any approximation. In order to anticipate a binding ZLB on nominal 
interest rates, this equation is first multiplied on both sides by R and in a second step 
maximized in such a way to be either zero or the value specified by the new right hand side of 
equation (11b). 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
{
 
 
 
 
𝑅 (
𝑅𝑡−1
𝑅
)
𝛾𝑅
(
 
 
(
Π𝑡
Π
)
𝛾Π
(
 
 
𝑦𝑡
𝑑
𝑦𝑡−1
𝑑
Λ𝑦𝑑
)
 
 
𝛾𝑦
)
 
 
1−𝛾𝑅
𝑒𝜀𝑚,𝑡; 0
}
 
 
 
 
     (11𝑏). 
 
C. The Deterministic Steady State 
After aggregating demand and supply equations, after solving for equilibrium conditions, and 
after de-trending the system, the following set of conditions can be identified, which 
determine the vector {?̃?, ?̃?, ?̃?, ?̃?, 𝜇, 𝑓, 𝑤∗, Π𝑤
∗
, 𝑙𝑑 , ?̃?𝑑 , ?̃?, ?̃?, 𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑚𝑐, Π∗, 𝑣𝑝, ?̃?, 𝑣𝑤, ?̃?, ?̃?, 𝑙} 
defining the steady state of this model. 
(1 − ℎ𝛽?̃?)
1
1 − (
ℎ
?̃?)
1
?̃?
= ?̃?     (12) 
𝑅 =
Π?̃?
𝛽
     (13) 
?̃? = 𝛾1     (14) 
?̃? =
1 −
𝛽
?̃?𝜇
(1 − 𝛿)
𝛽
?̃?𝜇
     (15) 
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(1 − 𝛽𝜃𝑤?̃?
(𝜂−1)Π−(1−𝜒𝑤)(1−𝜂))𝑓 =
𝜂 − 1
𝜂
𝑤∗?̃?(Π𝑤
∗
)
−𝜂
𝑙𝑑     (16) 
(1 − 𝛽𝜃𝑤?̃?
𝜂(1+𝛾)Π𝜂(1−𝜒𝑤)(1+𝛾))𝑓 = 𝜓(Π𝑤
∗
)
−𝜂(1+𝛾)
(𝑙𝑑)1+𝛾     (17) 
(1 − 𝛽𝜃𝑝Π
(1−𝜒)𝜀)𝑔1 = ?̃?𝑚𝑐?̃?𝑑      (18) 
(1 − 𝛽𝜃𝑝Π
−(1−𝜒)(1−𝜀))𝑔2 = ?̃?Π∗?̃?𝑑     (19) 
𝜀𝑔1 = (𝜀 − 1)𝑔2     (20) 
?̃?
𝑙𝑑
=
𝛼
1 − 𝛼
?̃?
?̃?
?̃?𝜇     (21) 
𝑚𝑐 = (
1
1 − 𝛼
)
1−𝛼
(
1
𝛼
)
𝛼
?̃?1−𝛼?̃?𝛼     (22) 
1 − 𝜃𝑤Π
−(1−𝜒𝑤)(1−𝜂)?̃?−(1−𝜂)
1 − 𝜃𝑤
= (Π𝑤
∗
)
1−𝜂
     (23) 
1 − 𝜃𝑝Π
−(1−𝜒)(1−𝜀)
1 − 𝜃𝑝
= Π∗1−𝜀     (24) 
?̃? + ?̃? = ?̃?𝑑      (25) 
𝑣𝑝?̃?𝑑 =
?̃?
?̃?
(?̃?)
𝛼
(𝑙𝑑)1−𝛼 − 𝜙     (26) 
𝑙 = 𝑣𝑤𝑙𝑑      (27) 
1 − 𝜃𝑝Π
(1−𝜒)𝜀
1 − 𝜃𝑝
𝑣𝑝 = Π∗−𝜀     (28) 
1 − 𝜃𝑤?̃?
𝜂Π(1−𝜒𝑤)𝜂
1 − 𝜃𝑤
𝑣𝑤 = (Π𝑤
∗
)−𝜂     (29) 
?̃? =
?̃?𝜇
?̃?𝜇 − (1 − 𝛿)
?̃?     (30). 
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D. Euro Area and U.S. Recessions 
 
Figure D1. The blue line represents the relative deviation of euro area real GDP from its HP (1600) trend during 
the years 1970 to 2014. The orange bars represent the reference points (provided by the CEPR) that served to 
compute the average recession size over the sample. The green bars represent the Great Recession which has 
been excluded from the calculations. Data (real GDP) originates from the Euro Area Business Cycle Network’s 
(EABCN) Area Wide Model database (AWM). 
Figure D2. The blue line represents the relative deviation of U.S. real GDP from its HP (1600) trend during the 
years 1970 to 2014. The red bars represent the reference points that served to compute the average recession size 
over the sample. Data (quarterly, seasonally adjusted annual rates of GDP growth of chained 2009 dollars) 
originates from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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Size of the… Euro area United States 
…smallest recession 1.7% (Q1 2013) 1.6% (Q4 2001) 
…largest recession 4.0% (Q1 1975) 6.6% (Q1 1975) 
…average recession 3.2% 3.8% 
Number of recessions 4 6 
Table D3. Overview of recession magnitudes in the euro area and the U.S. according to timing benchmarks by 
CEPR and NBER and own calculations. 
E. Shock Scenarios Under the “Old” and the “New Regime” 
# Inter-
temporal 
preference 
shock (𝜺𝒅) 
Labor supply 
shock (𝜺𝝋) 
Investment 
specific 
technology 
shock (𝜺𝝁) 
Neutral 
technology 
shock (𝜺𝑨) 
Max. output 
loss (Y) 
Min. buffer to 
ZLB 
(R, bps p.a.)15 
A -1 -1 -1 -1 2.94% 497 
B -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 4.33% 408 
C -2 -2 -2 -2 5.67% 321 
D -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 6.96% 235 
E -3 -3 -3 -3 8.22% 150 
F -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 9.43% 67 
G -1 0 0 0 0.69% 659 
H -2.5 0 0 0 1.50% 636 
I -4 0 0 0 2.12% 618 
J 0 -1 0 0 0.04% 606 
K 0 -3 0 0 0.14% 463 
L 0 -5 0 0 0.26% 325 
M 0 -7 0 0 0.40% 192 
N 0 -11 0 0 0.71% [-60] 
Nz 0 -11 0 0 0.70% constrained 
O 0 0 -1 0 0.03% 676 
P 0 0 0 -1 2.43% 586 
Q 0 0 0 -1.5 3.61% 538 
R 0 0 0 -2.5 5.92% 441 
S 0 0 0 -3.5 8.15% 339 
T 0 0 0 -4.5 10.30% 232 
Table E1. Shock scenarios under the “old regime”. Numbers designating the shock magnitude are relative to the 
standard shock. 3.0, for instance, represents a positive shock sized 3 times the respective standard shock. 
Maximum output loss is the largest negative deviation of Y from its steady state. Minimum buffer to the ZLB is 
the smallest nominal interest rate realized during a respective scenario. 
                                                          
15 The steady state nominal interest rate is 6.78% respectively 678 bps above the ZLB. 
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Figure E1. Shock scenarios under the “old regime”. Graphic illustration of table E1. 
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# Inter-
temporal 
preference 
shock (𝜺𝒅) 
Labor supply 
shock (𝜺𝝋) 
Investment 
specific 
technology 
shock (𝜺𝝁) 
Neutral 
technology 
shock (𝜺𝑨) 
Max. output 
loss (Y) 
Min. buffer to 
ZLB 
(R, bps p.a.)16 
A -1 -1 -1 -1 2.82% 150 
B -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 4.15% 44 
C -2 -2 -2 -2 5.44% [-61] 
Cz -2 -2 -2 -2 5.57% constrained 
D -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 6.68% [-164] 
Dz -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 7.30% constrained 
E -3 -3 -3 -3 7.88% [-256] 
F -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 9.04% [-365] 
G -1 0 0 0 0.64% 345 
H -2.5 0 0 0 1.39% 318 
I -4 0 0 0 1.96% 296 
J 0 -1 0 0 0.10% 276 
K 0 -3 0 0 0.33% 95 
L 0 -5 0 0 0.57% [-84] 
Lz 0 -5 0 0 0.53% constrained 
O 0 0 -1 0 0.03% 363 
P 0 0 0 -1 2.40% 259 
Q 0 0 0 -1.5 3.57% 205 
R 0 0 0 -2.5 5.84% 94 
S 0 0 0 -3.5 8.04% [-21] 
Sz 0 0 0 -3.5 8.07% constraint 
T 0 0 0 -4.5 10.17% [-140] 
Tz 0 0 0 -4.5 10.44% constrained 
Table E2. Shock scenarios under the “new regime”. Numbers designating the shock magnitude are relative to the 
standard shock. 3.0, for instance, represents a positive shock sized 3 times the respective standard shock. 
Maximum output loss is the largest negative deviation of Y from its steady state. Minimum buffer to the ZLB is 
the smallest nominal interest rate realized during a respective scenario. Scenarios Cz, Dz and Sz represent cases 
in which the ZLB has been enforced and is an effective constraint. Larger shocks (scenarios E and F) could not 
be tested under the ZLB constraint due to specificities of the model and the simulation technique applied. 
                                                          
16 The steady state nominal interest rate is 3.66% respectively 366 bps above the ZLB. 
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Figure E2. Shock scenarios under the “new regime”. Graphic illustration of table E2. 
F. Sensitivity Analysis 
# Inter-
temporal 
preference 
shock (𝜺𝒅) 
Labor supply 
shock (𝜺𝝋) 
Investment 
specific 
technology 
shock (𝜺𝝁) 
Neutral 
technology 
shock (𝜺𝑨) 
Max. output 
loss (Y) 
Min. buffer to 
ZLB 
(R, p.a.)17 
A -1 -1 -1 -1 2.86% 558 
B -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 4.22% 501 
C -2 -2 -2 -2 5.53% 445 
D -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 6.81% 392 
Table F1. Shock scenarios under the “old regime” under a Taylor rule by Bokan et al. (2016). Numbers 
designating the shock magnitude are relative to the standard shock. 2.5, for instance, represents a positive shock 
sized 2.5 times the respective standard shock. Maximum output loss is the largest negative deviation of Y from 
its steady state. Minimum buffer to the ZLB is the smallest nominal interest rate realized during a respective 
scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 The steady state nominal interest rate is 3.66% respectively 366 bps above the ZLB. 
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# Inter-
temporal 
preference 
shock (𝜺𝒅) 
Labor supply 
shock (𝜺𝝋) 
Investment 
specific 
technology 
shock (𝜺𝝁) 
Neutral 
technology 
shock (𝜺𝑨) 
Max. output 
loss (Y) 
Min. buffer to 
ZLB 
(R, p.a.)18 
A -1 -1 -1 -1 2.84% 480 
B -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 4.19% 383 
C -2 -2 -2 -2 5.49% 287 
D -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 6.76% 193 
Table F2. Shock scenarios under the “old regime” under a Taylor rule by Christiano et al. (2015). Numbers 
designating the shock magnitude are relative to the standard shock. 2.5, for instance, represents a positive shock 
sized 2.5 times the respective standard shock. Maximum output loss is the largest negative deviation of Y from 
its steady state. Minimum buffer to the ZLB is the smallest nominal interest rate realized during a respective 
scenario. 
# Inter-
temporal 
preference 
shock (𝜺𝒅) 
Labor supply 
shock (𝜺𝝋) 
Investment 
specific 
technology 
shock (𝜺𝝁) 
Neutral 
technology 
shock (𝜺𝑨) 
Max. output 
loss (Y) 
Min. buffer to 
ZLB 
(R, p.a.)19 
A -1 -1 -1 -1 2.89% 269 
B -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 4.25% 51 
C -2 -2 -2 -2 5.56% [-179] 
Cz -2 -2 -2 -2 5.68% constrained 
D -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 6.82% [-427] 
Dz -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 7.32% constrained 
Table F3. Shock scenarios under the “old regime” under a Taylor rule by Taylor (1993). Numbers designating 
the shock magnitude are relative to the standard shock. 2.5, for instance, represents a positive shock sized 2.5 
times the respective standard shock. Maximum output loss is the largest negative deviation of Y from its steady 
state. Minimum buffer to the ZLB is the smallest nominal interest rate realized during a respective scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 The steady state nominal interest rate is 3.66% respectively 366 bps above the ZLB. 
19 The steady state nominal interest rate is 3.66% respectively 366 bps above the ZLB. 
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# Inter-
temporal 
preference 
shock (𝜺𝒅) 
Labor supply 
shock (𝜺𝝋) 
Investment 
specific 
technology 
shock (𝜺𝝁) 
Neutral 
technology 
shock (𝜺𝑨) 
Max. output 
loss (Y) 
Min. buffer to 
ZLB 
(R, p.a.)20 
A -1 -1 -1 -1 2.73% 216 
B -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 4.03% 145 
C -2 -2 -2 -2 5.29% 76 
D -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 6.52% 10 
Table F4. Shock scenarios under the “new regime” under a Taylor rule by Bokan et al. (2016). Numbers 
designating the shock magnitude are relative to the standard shock. 2.5, for instance, represents a positive shock 
sized 2.5 times the respective standard shock. Maximum output loss is the largest negative deviation of Y from 
its steady state. Minimum buffer to the ZLB is the smallest nominal interest rate realized during a respective 
scenario. 
# Inter-
temporal 
preference 
shock (𝜺𝒅) 
Labor supply 
shock (𝜺𝝋) 
Investment 
specific 
technology 
shock (𝜺𝝁) 
Neutral 
technology 
shock (𝜺𝑨) 
Max. output 
loss (Y) 
Min. buffer to 
ZLB 
(R, p.a.)21 
A -1 -1 -1 -1 2.71% 126 
B -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 4.00% 9 
C -2 -2 -2 -2 5.24% [-106] 
Cz -2 -2 -2 -2 5.45% constrained 
D -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 6.45% [-222] 
Dz -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 7.09% constrained 
Table F5. Shock scenarios under the “new regime” under a Taylor rule by Christiano et al. (2015). Numbers 
designating the shock magnitude are relative to the standard shock. 2.5, for instance, represents a positive shock 
sized 2.5 times the respective standard shock. Maximum output loss is the largest negative deviation of Y from 
its steady state. Minimum buffer to the ZLB is the smallest nominal interest rate realized during a respective 
scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20 The steady state nominal interest rate is 3.66% respectively 366 bps above the ZLB. 
21 The steady state nominal interest rate is 3.66% respectively 366 bps above the ZLB. 
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# Inter-
temporal 
preference 
shock (𝜺𝒅) 
Labor supply 
shock (𝜺𝝋) 
Investment 
specific 
technology 
shock (𝜺𝝁) 
Neutral 
technology 
shock (𝜺𝑨) 
Max. output 
loss (Y) 
Min. buffer to 
ZLB 
(R, p.a.)22 
A -1 -1 -1 -1 2.77% [-93] 
Az -1 -1 -1 -1 2.84% constrained 
B -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 4.08% [-338] 
C -2 -2 -2 -2 5.33% [-602] 
D -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 6.53% [-883] 
Table F6. Shock scenarios under the “new regime” under a Taylor rule by Taylor (1993). Numbers designating 
the shock magnitude are relative to the standard shock. 2.5, for instance, represents a positive shock sized 2.5 
times the respective standard shock. Maximum output loss is the largest negative deviation of Y from its steady 
state. Minimum buffer to the ZLB is the smallest nominal interest rate realized during a respective scenario. 
                                                          
22 The steady state nominal interest rate is 3.66% respectively 366 bps above the ZLB. 
